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Segregation: An Atlanta Report

New Republic

COMMUNIST PARTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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ALSO IN THIS ISSUE

Poetic Critics *by Peter Viereck*
Granville Hicks *by Margaret Marshall*
Oh, Men! Oh, Women! *by Eric Bentley*

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

When Eisenhower made a truce in Korea he relieved Red China from pressure. Red China accordingly was able to back the war in Indo-China. Richard Nixon agreed to this estimate in his "off-the-record" speech to editors. Since then the French military position has steadily worsened (weakened by outdated colonialism). Now France may be able to hold out alone—which seems unlikely, even with continuing oblique US subsidies; she may buy a Moscow-tailored peace tending to weaken ties with Western allies; or, she may be elbowed out by a Communist drive threatening all Southeast Asia. The unresolved Washington issue is whether the stakes justify US intervention, particularly with British reluctance. As we understand it, the Administration aches to intervene. The Dulles school would act with a minimum of qualifications; Ike favors intervention but only if it is (a) collective (UN or with Britain), and (b) has the color of some Asiatic appeal (either real or in appearance). So the tense situation waits. No lead comes to the nation because the Administration can't yet make up its mind.

Ike's hope for lower tariffs has collapsed. We expected, and predicted, this collapse. Ike sincerely and earnestly wanted lower tariffs, we are persuaded; he wanted freer world commerce and "trade not aid." His 1952 campaign was studded with rosy hopes and promises. We regard this episode as a clear-cut case study of political ineptitude in a terribly important field. Give likeable Ike credit for good intentions and for knowing just how important lower US tariffs are. The cement of the Western alliance has been American direct aid, but now this era is ending and the only substitute is trade. If the US bars British and Japanese exports, they must seek greater outlets behind the Iron Curtain. Ike knew this; he knew that cutting tariffs is not a dole to Allies—it is a benefit to America itself. What did he do? He delayed. In the flush of his election victory in 1953 he could have got what he wanted on tariffs from Congress. Instead he waited one full year and named a study group—the Randall Commission. The ground had been thoroughly ploughed before, but Ike likes commissions as Hoover did. After concessions to high-tariff Republicans the commission brought in its report. It was a reasonably good report. It was now late, but still a battle might have defeated isolationist, high tariff Republicans. Did Ike fight? No. The price of a battle would have been to reveal the deep, fundamental GOP split, and Ike wouldn't pay it. Three weeks before the Reciprocal Trade Act automatically expires Ike announces that he is postponing his request for the three-year extension and accompanying plans for lowering tariffs. For this year he will only ask for a one-year *status quo* extension. In a project of crucial world importance Ike has taken a sickening defeat due primarily, we believe, to his own delay and vacillation. Many hoped that Ike would make the GOP over in his own image; the situation seems just the reverse.

Evidence is too strong to be denied, we believe, that McCarthy's popularity is declining. A year ago when Stassen tangled with McCarthy the White House hastily hauled Stassen back; at that time Joe was attacking Democrats. Now Joe is attacking the Administration. And so Stassen last week called Joe a liar, in so many words, and goes unrebuked. Stassen, curiously enough, thus becomes the White House spokesman in lieu of one Richard Nixon (the great McCarthy pacificator and foreign policy expert.) It seems rather doubtful, incidentally, if Nixon can be of much use to the GOP campaign this fall; he is so vulnerable from ill-considered recent speeches that make him the butt of Democratic ridicule.

McCarthy's decisive effect on religious amity in America has frequently been noted. A Catholic himself, he has tended to set Protestants and Catholics bickering; he has indirectly stirred up anti-Semitism; what is less realized is the deep fissure he is creating among Catholics. One prelate defends him, another assails him; now the church periodical in Brooklyn *The Tablet* directly and warmly attacks the Jesuit weekly *America* for criticizing McCarthy. The latest Gallup Poll shows that Republicans are the single remaining category still tipping to McCarthy's side—50 percent favorable to 37 percent unfavorable. While McCarthy's formal links with the GOP National Committee decline (thereby inevitably tending to put him at the head of the ultra-conservative, isolationist GOP faction) many individual Republican leaders undoubtedly hope that McCarthy can still be of use in certain specialized local elections with influence on low income Catholic city dwellers. Even here his value is doubtful. We were greatly struck when Sen. Homer Ferguson (R, Mich.) who faces a difficult re-election fight, publicly stated he did not want McCarthy's help. We know of no better weather-vane than Ferguson.

A lot of surprised GOP newspapers are asking editorially why Ike declined to reappoint able, nonpartisan Gordon Clapp—a man he's never met—as TVA chairman, although praising his record. Well, the answer is not very difficult really, though it comes as a surprise to the papers which are in question.

Eisenhower is surrounded by the private utility viewpoint; it is found in nearly every Administration approach to the power-conservation issue. Ike deeply distrusted the TVA experiment and public power.

We have just been mulling over a "Man Wanted" advertisement for Mr. Clapp's successor: "WANTED: TVA CHAIRMAN: high position, low pay; must be able to take oath of office as required by law, that he believes in TVA project, with a reservation that he considers it 'Creeping Socialism'; should be non-political, as required by law, but a good Republican; should support public power with a proviso that private utilities come first."

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Another "Mess" in the Making

IF THERE is to be a Congressional investigation of the Federal Housing Administration scandals, there is every reason to have it now. Instead, it is clear that the Republicans want to wait until election-time nears, then run a probe aimed not at exhuming facts, but at embarrassing Democrats. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee has postponed its investigation indefinitely. And the House Banking and Currency Committee has been forced into some very curious maneuvers by trying at once to look "informally" into the scandals and to protect the housing industry and ex-Congressman Albert Cole, now FHA Administrator. Despite the protests of Committee-members Richard Bolling (D, Mo.) and Abraham Multer (D, N.Y.), Chairman Jesse Wolcott of Michigan has refused to allow transcripts to be made of testimony from Cole and other witnesses—an almost unheard of ruling.

Bolling has criticized this secrecy, and Multer has introduced a resolution directing the Committee to hold open hearings on this matter and to keep records. The only answer has come from Clare Hoffman (R, Mich.), who says that nothing of the sort is needed since Cole himself has launched an executive department investigation of the scandals and appointed a special assistant, William T. McKenna, to handle it.

During his years in Congress, Cole heard repeated warnings from fellow-Congressmen like Multer about the possibilities of abuse in FHA loan procedures. He expressed his fundamental attitude toward such warnings when he said recently that the builder "had a right to outguess" the government if he could.

McKenna, Cole's choice for a "fact-finder," has had an interesting career in Washington. During the 1950-51 House investigation of the Home Loan Bank Board, McKenna appeared first as Assistant General Counsel, and a key witness, for the HLBB, the agency under investigation, then as minority (Republican) counsel for the Committee on Expenditures, which was investigating, then, as an investigator appointed by ranking minority-member Clare Hoffman for this same Committee. He next went to work for Coast Federal, the largest savings and loan institution in the country, and again came before the Committee in a third capacity —this time to challenge the authority of the Chairman to hold the hearings at all.

In 1952, McKenna registered as a lobbyist for the California Conference of Savings and Loan Associations. Immediately after his old friend and booster Clare Hoffman became Chairman of the old Committee on Expenditures (now the Committee on Government Operations) in January, 1953, he was made Chief Counsel for that Committee. In that capacity he accompanied Hoffman to Los Angeles to hold Public Housing hearings on the eve of the Mayoralty elections—hearings in which the Democratic members refused to participate and which were recognized throughout the country for their crude political motivation.

Everything is in good hands, the Republicans say. There is no need for anyone to bother about the FHA scandals yet—everything is being made ready and pretty soon now, toward the end of summer, we'll open the show.

Pegler in Trouble

WESTBROOK PEGLER is given to boasting that none of the many people he vilifies ever succeeds in getting him into a courtroom to face trial. One has. After four years of countering Pegler's legalistic maneuvers, Quentin Reynolds has him before a federal judge and a jury trying to talk his way out of a $500,000 libel suit. Co-defendant is the Hearst Corporation. The principals are fairly prominent; the sum involved is substantial. Yet, 10 days after the trial opened, it is still almost impossible to find any but the briefest mention of it in the press —although the wire-service reporters have been filing the story.

In 1949, Quentin Reynolds reviewed a biography of the late columnist Heywood Broun for the *New York Herald Tribune*. In one of his typical columns, used by 186 newspapers with 12 million readers, Pegler called Reynolds a "British propagandist," and a "pro-Communist"; he spoke of his "yellow streak" and his "mangy hide." The *Herald Tribune* was rebuked for being "leftist."

Now that the trial has begun, it is strange that so few editors who supply their readers with Pegler's opinions are inclined to keep them informed as to his fortunes.

Select Club

THAT SUPER-COMBINE of five Pacific-Northwest power companies—formed to take over the Bonneville Power Administration as the Republicans dismantle it —(*NR*, May 17) has plans proportionate to its size. Already controlling the electricity used by one-half of the citizens up there, it does not intend to stop with a virtual monopoly of conventional power sources. Admiral Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the combine have announced an "agreement" by which the power companies will "study" the feasibility of building an electricity-producing nuclear reactor—and, of course, be on the ground floor of any "feasible" project which may come about.

Interestingly, the agreement was not even whispered about until settled. There was no effort by the AEC to discover if, for example, a combination of Washington State Public Utility Districts might wish to participate in the development of atomic peacetime power for their home area.

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While You Weren't Looking . . .

The House Didn't Read Some Fine Print

THE ADMINISTRATION'S proposed revision of the tax code runs to 875 closely printed pages. The casual reader can drown—and the expert has trouble staying afloat—in this ocean of legal language. Once worked in among the fine-meshed complexities of the Internal Revenue Code, a trick provision can go a long time unnoticed. Nobody knows how many "sleepers" there are in the new tax bill. After being almost a year in preparation, it was jammed through the House Ways and Means Committee with minimum opportunity for analysis or debate, and it was passed by the House itself under a closed rule that forbade amendment from the floor. "We frankly admit that we do not fully understand or comprehend many of the changes proposed"—thus, with plaintive candor, went the minority committee report on the proposed new Code.

Employee pension plans, of which some 15,000 are now in operation, give wage-earners old-age security over and above the bare subsistence pensions paid under social security. Profit-sharing plans can help—within obvious limits—to offset the tendency toward concentration of income in the hands of the owners of capital. Present law exempts from tax an employer's contributions to a bona-fide pension or profit-sharing trust, requiring only that the plan cover a majority of his employees—the minimum ranges from 56 to 70 percent—and that the benefits of the plan be equitably distributed.

But the Republican Administration would "simplify" these provisions. Under the proposed Code an employer's pension arrangements would be democratic enough if they covered as few as a quarter of the regular working force. He may choose in any way he pleases the 25 percent who are to benefit. The plan will still be "non-discriminatory"—even if it is limited to the highest-paid 25 percent of the employees, the first 25 percent to join the GOP club, or the 25 percent with the bluest eyes.

In fact, the employer can narrow his plan still further: include as few employees as he wishes, provided only that no more than 30 percent of his contributions are for the benefit of employee-shareholders and no more than 10 percent of the plan's participants are "key employees."

What do these provisos really mean? The jokers are in fine print. A "shareholder" is not, as you might suppose, just anyone who owns stock in the company; an employee is a shareholder, according to the proposed statute, only if he owns more than *10 percent* of the voting stock. There are hundreds of thousands of companies, whose stock is widely held and publicly traded, which have no shareholders at all by this definition; for all such companies as these the 30-percent limitation is meaningless.

And who are "key employees"? These, it turns out, are "the highest paid 10 percent of the regular employees . . . (up to a limit of the 100 highest paid employees)." If you happen to head a company with 100,000 or so employees, don't overlook the 10 little words in parentheses. They mean that you can set up an annuity or profit-sharing plan for your 1,000 top executives and claim tax exemption for the whole project. Whatever the other 99,000 employees may think, your plan will be officially blessed as "non-discriminatory."

The present law requires that benefits of a tax-free trust be distributed equitably among the participants. The new code breaches even this principle. It says, in the first place, that while benefits must be proportionate to wages or salaries, the first $4,000 of regular compensation may be disregarded in establishing this ratio. Within certain limits, moreover, it allows favored participants in a profit-sharing plan to receive up to twice as much, per dollar of compensation, as other participants.

To see the full import of these fine-spun subtleties and india-rubber definitions, take the case of a $100,000-a-year corporation head. His company is prepared to give him a $20,000 raise. He plans to retire in 10 years. If he takes his raise as a straight pay increase it will total $200,000 over the next 10 years; but his taxes on this sum will come to $180,000. But if, under the new tax bill, he chooses to take his raise in the form of a $20,000 pension for 10 years after he retires, taxes on the $200,000 will only be $81,000. This may pass as an employee pension system; it looks much like a tax-evasion system.

Bricker's Friends

SEN. JOHN W. BRICKER (R, Ohio) is not one to forget old friends—especially when they are clients of the Columbus law firm which contributes to his income. And he has worked up a neat legislative gambit to further their interests in the Senate. Some of the Senators have begun to catch on, though, and the thing isn't working too well.

Bricker used to be rather crude. There was, for example, the St. Lawrence Seaway bill which he, in his capacity as chairman of the powerful Foreign and Interstate Commerce Committee, sat on

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for a long time, preventing Senate action—the Pennsylvania Railroad opposed the bill, and the Pennsy is a client of that Columbus law firm. But lately he has demonstrated a new finesse, as when he maneuvered another vitiating amendment to the Natural Gas Act—another client: the East Ohio Gas Co.—through the Senate on March 15. The new technique (described in the *NR* of March 29) consists of waiting until the attention of the Senate is diverted by some dramatic issue, reporting favorably, as chairman of a committee, some bill upon which there have been no hearings—sometimes as a substitute for a bill on which there have been hearings—describing it to the few Senators in the chamber as an effort to rectify some grave injustice, then calling for a vote.

Last week all was going according to plan. During the last session Bricker had introduced a bill requiring the Interstate Commerce Commission to grant within 60 days—and without investigation—rate increases requested by railroads. The ICC could investigate *after* the increase had been granted and if it found that increase unjustified, everybody could get a refund—if they had kept their ticket stubs and freight bills and would go to the trouble of submitting them. Hearings were held and the bill was denounced by every government agency connected with transportation, and by shippers, farmers and truckers. So, last week Bricker brought in for passage a "substitution" which, he assured the Senate, met all objections. There had not, of course, been any hearings on the new bill. Actually the only major changes were that the truck and bus lines were included in the charmed circle previously reserved for the railroads.

Unfortunately for Bricker, Sen. Mike Monroney (D, Okla.) was present. He asked some questions, then he called the bill by its right name: "an obnoxious rate grab . . . a special interest bill." And he denounced "one of the most powerful lobbies . . . it has ever been my displeasure to witness." George Smathers (D, Fla.) and Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) quickly came to Monroney's support and, after two days of debate, the bill was sent back to Committee by a margin of only two votes: 39 to 37. The railroads, especially the Pennsy, were annoyed—as, we must assume, were Bricker's partners in that Columbus law firm.

Asia in the Gold-Fish Bowl

THE DIFFICULTIES of diplomacy in a gold-fish bowl are generally recognized nowadays. But the hazards of public negotiation are immeasurably increased when in addition some of the parties to the dispute are compelled by public pressure at home to expose even their most tentative thoughts aloud with a precision which often falsifies the facts. The extraordinary procession of contradictory statements made by American spokesmen during the Indo-China crisis will stand for years as a classic example. And in this case confusion is worse confounded by the American tradition of reaching political decisions by confronting public opinion simultaneously with ex-cathedra statements of conflicting views held inside the Administration. It came as quite a shock to the British Government to find that the demands made of it at the height of crisis over Dien Bien Phu by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been agreed even by the National Security Council, still less the Administration as a whole.

Similar difficulties beset the French Government facing a Parliament which refuses to sanction any foreign policy at all, though here M. Bidault has cut the Gordian knot by plunging ahead on a policy of his own without any attempt to inform the public or to win parliamentary support for it. Even so, it is difficult to understand how, after a series of American statements had exposed the paralysis of America's Far Eastern policy, General Navarre felt he was helping the situation by his public admission that France could not now win the Indo-China war without foreign military intervention.

Against these official notices of bankruptcy from two of the three Western powers it is difficult to see how negotiations at Geneva can save anything of Indo-China from the wreckage — the Communists have been given no incentive to compromise. But Britain, having been compelled to publish her unwillingness to intervene with arms, is now fulfilling her consequent obligation to seek some diplomatic settlement.

At present great restraint is being shown in London by both Government and Opposition on this point. Though the agreement to consider a defense pact for Southeast Asia—a SEATO—was the occasion of Bevan's recent resignation from the Labour Shadow Cabinet, even Bevan himself is holding back, influenced no doubt by the reports from his lieutenant in Geneva, Richard Crossman, that Eden is behaving impeccably. In a careful statement last Monday Churchill announced that Britain would accept no new commitments until the outcome of the Geneva conference was clear, confining herself wholly at present to the search for a negotiated settlement in Indo-China.

None the less, the nature of Britain's dilemma is emerging. All Britain's military formations are already abroad—five divisions in Europe, the other five in Suez, Africa, Malaya, and Hong Kong. Unless she can rid herself of some of these commitments and thus establish a mobile reserve, she can not in any case provide material help for any SEATO except to a small extent with ships and planes. But the value of sea and air power in halting Communist advance in Asia has already been discredited. To extend one's commitments without first obtaining the means to honor them in a crisis is the most dangerous and dishonorable of all diplomatic follies.

Thus the military value of any SEATO will depend either on America providing more overseas troops, which is both unlikely and undesirable, or persuading the Asian peoples themselves to accept at least the manpower burdens of self-defense. This means primarily obtaining the support of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia—the Colombo powers. A pact based exclusively on countries regarded in Asia as American satellites, like South Korea, Nationalist China and Siam, would add little to the military strength of the decisive area, and would immensely weaken the chances of obtaining support from the Colombo powers at any stage.

For this reason the feeling is growing in London that if the Colombo powers are unwilling to commit themselves to a fully-fledged military pact with the West at this time, it would be better to construct some purely political association with them than to risk losing them entirely.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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• **Segregation: A Report from Atlanta**



The South Will Go Along

by Harold C. Fleming

PROBABLY no decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court was better tailored to its purpose than the historic ruling against racial segregation in the public schools. For a long succession of jittery Monday mornings the South had braced itself for an ultimatum. Most Southerners expected the court to demand an end to legally separate schools, and they never doubted that the terms of surrender would be dictated in galling detail. No one was prepared for the disarming affirmation of principle that Chief Justice Warren read for a unanimous court. There were no terms—those would be hammered out later in consultation with the states affected—merely the calm declaration that segregation of school children cannot be squared with the United States Constitution.

In the aftermath of this decision, Herman Talmadge's rebel yells of defiance were a jarring and isolated note. His threat that "Georgians will fight" awoke only a few feeble echoes in the other states of the region. Other Southern Governors correctly sensed that their people were in no mood for secessionist rhetoric or obstructionist promises. Certainly the decision was not popular with the great majority of white Southerners, but it had an authentic ring of justice and, in any case, was irrevocable. Most people—white and Negro alike—wanted to go about their business and give the news time to sink in.

The court wisely provided plenty of time, evidently recognizing that the first and most important adjustment must take place in people's minds. When the nine Justices reassemble in October much of the South will have digested the idea of legally integrated schools and will be ready with plans for gradual compliance. One or two states may boycott the court hearing on mechanics of enforcement, and one or two more may come up with proposals that are no more than thinly disguised resistance. But those states too will ultimately amend their laws to conform to the new ruling.

These statutory reforms will bring about no sweeping or universal changes in the dual school system. Whatever implementation is finally ordered by the court, the reaction will vary tremendously over the 17 states affected. It is already apparent that the border states, where Negroes are relatively few and segregation has

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shallow roots, will make the transition swiftly and easily. Many mountain counties in the South will also integrate their schools with something approaching relief. For them, the attempt to afford "separate but equal" facilities for a comparative handful of Negro children has been costly and difficult beyond all reason. In the industrial Piedmont section the change will be slower and spottier, but cities and factories, family farms and trade unions have shown themselves to be basically allies of social progress.

ACROSS the states of the deep South—South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi — stretches the "black belt," the old feudal kingdom of plantation cotton. Here the Negro population is most concentrated, in some counties larger than the white population. And here segregation is supported by economic and social forces more powerful than the laws that give them expression. It has been exactly 10 years since the federal courts outlawed the "white primary"; yet there are still counties in this area where no Negro has cast a ballot. It requires no extraordinary gift of prophecy to foresee that white and Negro children will attend separate schools in the "black belt" region for at least some years to come.

The remarkable Southern calm in the wake of the decision must be attributed in part to the widely held conviction that it heralds no great change. City-dwelling Southerners have been assured by their local officials that residential segregation will preserve the separate schools, law or no law. And Southerners everywhere have been told by many white spokesmen—and by a few Negroes —that Negro parents do not *really* want their children to attend mixed schools. Both of these statements contain much truth, though not as much as they have been credited with.

Most Southern cities, like their counterparts in the North and West, have well-defined Negro sections, usually in the decaying central areas. Under normal neighborhood districting most Negro children would go to elementary schools attended wholly or largely by pupils of their own race. There are many exceptions to this rule, however. Every city has its "fringe" areas where white and Negro communities meet, its islands of Negro housing encircled by expanding white suburbs, and its "backyard" Negro dwellings that date from a time when domestic servants settled near their employers. Residential patterns will insure a high degree of "natural" segregation in the schools. But a fantastic amount of gerrymandering will be required to preserve it intact; and no amount of gerrymandering can save it in the high schools, which ordinarily draw their students from large areas of population that transcend any strict district lines.

The claim that Negro parents have no wish to enroll their children in "white" schools is harder to assess. There is little reason to doubt that the legal attack on separate schools had the allegiance of virtually all Negroes, in the South as elsewhere. Now that the stigma of law has been removed, it is problematical how many Negroes will press their newly acquired right. Since apathy knows no color bar, many Negro parents will no doubt follow the line of least resistance, as laid down by local authorities. Others will be influenced by the comparative advantages of the "white" and "Negro" schools, as schools. Certainly most Negro parents would hesitate to send their children into a hostile or potentially violent situation. But it would be pessimistic indeed to predict wholesale use of children as the instruments and victims of adult wrath.

Preoccupation with the problems of integration should not obscure the profoundly positive significance of the Supreme Court's decision. For the 2.5 million Negro children involved it will mean a freshening of the spirit, a liberating sense of their individual value in the American scheme of things. For millions of white children it will mean a chance to grow up without the blinders of racial prejudice and the burden of racial guilt. For the parents of both it will mean an incentive to find new ways of thinking and feeling together. These are precious commodities in a democracy—particularly an embattled democracy that often finds itself doubting its inner resources.

It is all too easy to magnify the practical difficulties that may arise in the short run from the outlawing of public school segregation. There is no doubt at all that in the long run an incalculable volume of good will result. The two races in the South have survived an enormous amount of change in the last 15 years. With occasional prodding by the courts and the federal government, white Southerners have voted with, and more recently for, their fellow Negro citizens; have ridden unsegregated on interstate trains; have opened the doors of their state universities to Negroes; have served without racial distinctions in the armed forces—many in Southern Army camps. On the whole, Southerners of both races have met the new situations well. A good many have developed a strong preference for this new kind of relationship.

NOW THE Supreme Court has touched off another, more far-reaching process. It has started with an unprecedented invitation to the South to help work out the implementing decrees. Negro leadership has made a magnanimous offer to co-operate with white citizens in resolving the problems of adjustment. It will now be possible in the South to speak of integration as a goal to be lawfully achieved rather than a heresy to be shunned and despised.

The strait-jacket of legal segregation that has confined so many Southern sympathies for so long is about to fall away. We may witness something extraordinary in the way of human growth.

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Communist Parties in Southeast Asia

by Colin Jackson

DOES the victory of Ho Chi Minh at Dien Bien Phu prophesy the imminent success of other Communists in other countries of Southeast Asia? Does Red China's dominance over North Korea and Northern Viet-Nam mark the beginning of an all-out Chinese attempt to conquer these other countries, and exactly which country, Russia or China, exercises decisive control over the Communist parties in this part of the world?

Mao Tse-tung has made no secret of the fact that he considers Burma, Siam and Malaya Chinese territories that must like Tibet be brought under the control of Red China. Undoubtedly in the last five years it is Red China which has forced the pace here. And there is every sign that Peking in the next five years will forego plans for military expansion to concentrate her energy on extending her power by a policy of victory from within. China will try to bring down non-Communist governments by internal revolution. And in her campaign of destruction she will be helped by starvation, frustration, corruption and the fear of colonialism throughout the area.

The priority target for Chinese Communists is Indonesia, where they have already had considerable success. Since August, 1953, the government of Indonesia has depended on their co-operation and support. At the beginning of 1952, after the meeting of the Eastern Cominform at Peking, the Indonesian Communist Party received instructions to give up the campaign of violence that had been the basis of their policy since the ill-fated Madiun rising of 1948. Now the party uses its key position in this shaky democracy to keep the government in a state of perpetual instability. The present Premier Sastromidjojo's Minister of Defense, Mr. Iwa, is notoriously pro-Communist. Despite many protests he has followed a policy of promoting Communist sympathizers in the army. As a result, in the event of an uprising the loyalty of the army could not be relied upon. It might even make common cause with the Communist rebels.

Colin Jackson, British lecturer and writer, recently returned from a five-month tour of Southeast Asia.

On the economic side the Communist Party in Indonesia has followed a policy of calculated disruption. On the one hand they have opposed financial aid that would permit an expanding economy; on the other they have blocked any attempt at budget economies permitting a financial strengthening of the country. The result: a decline in the value of the Rupiah, and the dislocation of the rubber, tin and oil industries.

The Communist control of the farm workers as well as of industrial labor is increasing. In September, 1953, the Red-dominated National Farmers Association voted out the Socialists. The Peasant and Workers Party, Communist controlled, polled 25 percent in the poverty-stricken rural districts of Central Java in the country's first local elections.

In all these efforts the Communist Party in Indonesia has been helped by the two million Chinese in the country. Five thousand of these are sent to study in Red China each year. The Chinese Consulates in Sumatra, Borneo and the Celebes are centers of Communist espionage. Recently, however, Chinese participation in the Communist Party has been toned down and an interesting battle between Moscow and Peking for control is in progress. Moscow has scored several successes of late.

But whatever the outcome of this internal struggle the Communists are in a very strong position. From what I was told in Djakarta it would seem that the only real chance of defeating the Communists lies in the holding of a General Election. This would bring a victory for the Masjumi Party, possibly allied with the Socialists. Certainly all observers are agreed that the present government party, the PNI, would lose heavily. With an electoral mandate the Masjumi could deal firmly with the Communist disruption campaign. And with a firm majority in Parliament they could tackle the country's economic and agricultural problems. But unrest, administrative inefficiency and party intrigue combine to make a decision

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as to the date for an election impossible. The present date is 1955, but in 1955 the date will probably be 1956. Before then, if things continue as at present, a Communist coup is a real possibility.

INDONESIA'S next door neighbor, Malaya, has been fighting the Communists—90 percent Chinese in composition—since 1948. The tactic of disguised disruption is impossible here. The Communists have had to fight and they have been losing consistently since 1950. In December, 1951, following the Peking directive, the party line was changed and terrorist tactics, the indiscriminate murder of civilians, was ordered ceased. The party hoped that this would soften the military campaign against them. They also hoped that some non-Communist Nationalists then would respond to United Front offers from Min Yuen Agents. Neither happened, and by the end of last year the Communist Party in Malaya was in a sorry state. Chinese Communist guerrillas were reduced to tiny forces of three or four men hiding in the jungle and capable only of a few hit-and-run attacks on vehicles. Whole districts had been declared "safe" by General Templer. And a split in the party ranks occurred. From captured documents it appears that the civilian workers urged greater concentration on propaganda, recruitment and the organization of food supplies. But the military members of the party argued that sabotage and terrorism should again be tried. The military won, but in practice have not been supported.

In February, 1954, the Communist headquarters was moved from Malaya to Northern Sumatra. The terrorist campaign of brutal murder alienated many Malays and Indians who, although impatient for self-government, would not co-operate with a violent gang of thugs. And the Malayan Communist Party has never been successful in gaining military recruits from the Indian and Malay population. It has remained identified with the Chinese, and the extremist Chinese at that. Now the proposals of the High Commission to allow an elected majority in the new legislature will weaken still further the Communist cause. Mr. Peterson, head of the Malayan Government Information Services, told me that one of the few bright spots for the Communists in Malaya is the continuing unemployment of the younger Chinese. Out of work and cut off from promotion in the army and civil service, many of these young Chinese provide reluctant recruits for the Min Yuen branch of the party. But unless Red China succeeds in advancing down through Indo-China and Siam to the borders of Malaya, it would appear that the Communist Party in this country is due to remain a small and insignificant minority. In a self-governing Malaya it would certainly be of no effect.

Siam, Malaya's neighbor to the North, with its absence of anti-Imperialist grievances, its strong Buddhist tradition and its plentiful food supply, is basically in a strong position to resist Communism.

Siam's government, under Marshal Phibul and General Phao, has never been too particular about democratic procedure in tackling Communism. The Communist Party is illegal, and suspected sympathizers are locked up without a trial. The National Peace Committee, the Communist Front Organization, has been dealt with ruthlessly. All newspapers displaying left-wing tendencies have been purged, and as recently as May last year seven doubtful journalists were deported.

I was told in Bangkok that the real Communist danger in Siam centered in the three million Chinese who make up nearly 20 percent of the country's population. This community, which controls four-fifths of the nation's trade, has been persecuted and discriminated against by the present regime. Residence qualifications, registration fees and an infinite variety of taxes have all been used to fleece the Chinese. As a result if a Communist force arrived at the Siamese border, these three million would be so many potential enemies within. In Northern Siam, Laotian elements are also a political danger.

But the only real chance of Communist success in Siam lies in a military *coup d'etat*. If there were a drastic fall in the world price of rice and rubber, the country's prosperity would be severely affected. In conditions of economic crisis one of Phibul's rivals might attempt to oust him on a strongly left-wing pro-Peking line.

FINALLY there is Burma—which must have proved a great disappointment to Moscow and Peking. The party there has never been in weaker condition. In October, 1953, it was outlawed by the realistic Socialist government, the anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. The Communist Party now had degenerated into a petty hit-and-run affair with its only real strength concentrated in the Arakan. Led by self-styled Marshal Than and H. M. Goshal, the Burma Communist Party White Flag force had some 25,000 armed supporters at the beginning of their revolt in March, 1948. Today the total is probably not more than two thousand. The Peking Directive of December, 1951, limiting armed struggle and ordering increased political participation throughout Southeastern Asia, has never been followed effectively in Burma. The confusion amongst the two Communist parties—White Flag and Red Flag—and their allies, the People's Comrades Party, has enabled U Nu and his government to pick them off one by one.

Burma's strong economic position and full treasury have deprived the Communist Party of the necessary economic grievances to exploit. And the ultra left-wing speeches of Burma's two strong men, the Ministers of Defense and Industry, have out-Marxed the Marxists. In 1948, Burma's administration was often referred to as the Rangoon government, as its power extended only a few miles outside the capital. When I was in Rangoon last Autumn it controlled over 80 percent of the country and was growing stronger every day.

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The only chance for Communism in Burma is a sudden turn for the worse in Burma's economic situation—India has recently refused to take some of Burma's rice, and Ceylon is no longer the steady market that she used to be before the war—and the fact that Red China now has direct contact with Burmese Communists in the Northeast. If Burma were given a greater priority in Peking's plans, material aid across the border to Burma's groggy Communists could be increased.

A five-month tour of Southeast Asia convinced me that the attempted co-ordination of Communist policy from Peking after the Eastern Cominform meeting in late 1951 has not succeeded. The change-over from the 1948-1951 policy of terrorism to one of political co-operation for disruption from within has shown signs of success only in Indonesia. It would seem that Communist leadership material in Southeast Asia is markedly inferior. Neither Burma, Siam nor Malaya has anyone who approaches the ability and dynamic leadership of Ho Chi Minh. In Indonesia it may be that young Aidit, the Secretary General, will emerge as a really powerful Communist figure. But he is a Moscow rather than a Peking man.

The struggle between Russia and China for the control of local Communist parties has not yet been decisive. Peking has the advantage of ready-made recruits among the Chinese population of these Southeast Asian nations. But recent excesses in Red China have dampened the early enthusiasm of these 12 million ex-patriot Chinese. In any case, Chinese support in Malaya and Siam where the Chinese population is distrusted by other elements in the country could be a liability to Peking. It is worth remembering that despite the so-called Common Front of Moscow and Peking when Asian affairs are mentioned at Geneva this unity is not reflected in their Southeast Asian policies. Here they are engaged in an all-out struggle for control. It is probable that China, an Asian nation in close proximity to the area, will prove the winner. But in India the Communist Party remains firmly orientated toward Moscow.

In the long run the main hope of Communism in Southeast Asia must lie in the appallingly low standards of living and in the inefficiency and corruption of the non-Communist governments. To this weapon must be added the Asians' almost pathological fear and dislike of Western imperialism, economic or political, past and present. The Communists will be able to exploit anti-French, anti-Dutch, anti-American and anti-British feelings, and the envy of the rich and impatient Westerner for a long time to come.

What's Blocking Freer Trade? — II

The President again abandons his trade program as declining exports cost us income and jobs.

by A. G. Mezerik

THAT PRODUCT of "a year of study" — President Eisenhower's trade program—is still buried somewhere in the files of protectionist Dan Reed's (R, N.Y.) House Ways and Means Committee. And as the June 12 expiration date of the present Reciprocal Trade Act approaches, Reed and his best ally on the Committee, Richard M. Simpson (R, Pa.), have resorted to the same strategy they used a year ago to frighten the Administration into a foolish compromise: they have prevailed upon a group of like-thinkers to introduce a bill (HR 9159) which goes even beyond Simpson's attempt last year to restrict sharply the Executive Department's authority to regulate tariffs. The new bill, produced by protection-lobbyist O. R. Strackbein and introduced by Republican Rep. Oakley Hunter, of Fresno, California, would simply transfer all tariff-making authority to the Congress—a situation which the late Republican Sen. Arthur Vandenburg called "atrocious."

The President's innocuous trade program (complete with the "Buy American" and "peril point" provisions of the present outmoded act), its present fate at the hands of Dan Reed and company, and its probable fate at the hands of a House in which a vast majority of Republicans are on record for "protection," illustrates the national schizophrenia I described last week—talk for free trade and action against it.

During 1953, that dual approach resulted in almost $1 billion drop in American exports: wheat exports fell 37 percent; cotton, 40; textile, 24; coal and related products, 32; iron and steel, 20. So we have a dilemma: to conserve jobs and profits we would like to keep out

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High-tariff Congressmen once again are trying to usurp the President's authority to raise and lower trade-barriers. In 1948, the late Republican Sen. Arthur Vandenberg spoke his mind on this subject.

"Tariff rate-making in Congress is an atrocity. It lacks any element of economic science or validity. I suspect the 10 members of the Senate, including myself, who struggled through the 11 months it took to write the last Congressional tariff act, would join me in resigning before they would be willing to tackle another general Congressional tariff revision." (Cong. Rec., June 12, 1948, p. 8324).

foreign competition. But American industrial production has increased by more than a third since 1948 and farm production has jumped higher than that. That capacity is more than present American buying power can absorb. To utilize our capacity under conditions of full employment means to increase exports.

As it is, the facts show the high employment levels of 1953 were in a large part due to exports. In that year 3 million workers owed their jobs to exports and to the industries supplying or servicing exporters. Ten percent of America's coal, gas and electric production went into the making of export goods. In those industries, exports accounted for 88,000 jobs. On railroads the figure was even larger—173,000. Percentagewise, our exports are impressive: Twenty-five percent of the textile machinery produced in this country, 22 percent of all machine tools, 21 percent of tractors, 19 percent of printing machinery, 16 percent of oil field machinery, 13 percent of diesel engines, 11 percent of motor trucks and 11 percent of agricultural machinery.

How much unemployment will there be in the tractor industry if farm purchasing power plummets downwards because of lower export sales of cotton, wheat and tobacco? In 1951, 13 cents of every dollar received by United States farmers came from farm exports. By 1952, the value of United States agricultural exports had declined by 31 percent. They are now declining even more rapidly. Meanwhile surpluses of agricultural products, which have been big, grow bigger—making ever more imminent an American farm depression brought about by a glut overhanging the domestic market. But with the farmers it is not a simple question of selling more to other countries at world prices. On most basic farm products, domestic support prices are so high—in terms of world prices—that the farmer cannot hope to sell directly to foreign lands.

On this front, the farmer wants the government to pay him the full domestic price. Once he has this payment, he wants the government to sell his produce to other countries at a price competitive in the world market. Were any other country to try this on the United States, our government would label it subsidy, state trading and dumping and take strong measures against it. As it works now the American policy not only infuriates other countries but it has ironic overtones. The United States put a lot of money into helping the Italian economy get onto its feet. Today the United States is cutting Italy out of the market for oranges in Northern and Central Europe by subsidizing the export of oranges from the United States to Europe. The United States is cutting Turkey's trade throat by subsidizing the export of raisins to the European market—where Turkey, darling of American aid, used to make an honest dollar.

Foreign countries do not welcome this dumping system nor do they like that other apple of the American farmer's eye—wherein the United States Government buys the food from farmers at support prices and then gives the food away to other countries—courtesy of the American taxpayers.

Sooner or later, the American farm problem will have to be dealt with in realistic terms which demand answers in terms of international trade.

PERHAPS the best clues as to future developments in resolving the international trade dilemma are to be found in the business world. International commerce is now very big. Including overseas investments, licensing of patents and managerial and technological assistance contracts, international commerce runs to $30 billion for the United States alone. A growing number of influential American businessmen have an increasing stake in this pile. These are the men who are presently trying to work out some new economic equations which will encompass political realities. They point out that the desirability of protecting those Americans who make cheese or hats is easily understood but they ask whether that is as important as maintaining the ability of all other Americans to trade with the world. The sum total of all the business being done in and out of the United States by the most protected industries is not much more than the value of our exports of wheat, cotton and tobacco. Are briar pipes as vital to the national interest as winning or keeping international friendship?

Of this group of businessmen who want trade walls lowered even in their own lines, Henry Ford II has attracted the most attention with his proposal that all tariffs on automobiles be abolished. H. P. Heinz II, Warren Pierson, Thomas J. Watson Jr., Harvey Firestone Jr., David Sarnoff, Benjamin Fairless and James A. Farley are a few of the well-known figures who, as part of the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, have advocated that American tariffs be cut unilaterally by 20 percent at the minimum.

Some of these men, noting the drop in government spending for armaments, see freer trade as a kind of depression insurance. And it is obvious that expanded trade can build markets for part of the $50 billion a year in United States production which now goes to defense. Some have absorbed the lessons of the Paley and

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the Rockefeller studies. Both of these reports accented two-way trade, though each laid undue emphasis on the importation of those raw materials which are essential to our industrial survival. They gave little space to the necessity and desirability of American purchasing of the goods manufactured in other countries.

However, the Paley Report made clear some acute absurdities in our tariff picture. We import 100 percent of our graphite but impose a 7.7 percent tariff on it. We import 92 percent of our mercury and have a 39.5 percent tariff on it. We tax tungsten 41.3 percent—and these are all indispensables. Making a recommendation that we eliminate the tariff on materials on which the United States is completely dependent—or likely to become so—the Commission showed that horse sense is possible in the atomic age.

Horse sense can also be applied to the agencies that buy for the public. As an example of public buying on the two way principle, the Chief Joseph Dam incident was a sorry mess but the situation is not much better where so-called offshore purchasing is involved. Of this Winthrop W. Aldrich, Ambassador to Britain, said, "The present policy is clearly archaic. Let us make our public purchases wherever goods of comparable quality can be found on competitive and advantageous terms."

THESE MEN are the internationally-minded businessmen—the manufacturers, the bankers and the traders. This group has, in the last few months, got organized. Led by Harry Bullis, Chairman of General Mills and John J. McCloy of Chase National Bank, the Committee for a National Trade Policy was sparked into being at a dinner at the Waldorf on October 26, 1953, at which Henry Ford II spoke. John S. Coleman, president of the Burroughs Corporation of Detroit, became Chairman of the Committee. Charles P. Taft, brother of the late Senator, is the president. The operating executive is John H. Ferguson, a lawyer of New York and Washington.

The Committee has its work cut out and knows it. The job is two-pronged. It involves education at the grassroots level and pressure in the halls of Congress where the Committee is registered as a lobbying organization.

On both fronts, legislative and grassroots, the Committee faces a big job, for the subject is indeed complicated. Tariffs are, of course, only one of many types of trade restrictions—yet tariffs have to be seen in many contexts. The school books told us that an important consideration of tariff was revenue—but as revenue the $600 million paid annually in duties is a drop in the national bucket. Tariffs are protection for infant industry—but in our time we use other means to bar that competition which might interfere with the few industries we need to nurture. Tariffs also are supposed to control competition from foreign sources, but only 1/8 of our imports—$1.4 billion out of $11 billion—are goods which ever go into competition with our own products.

More than all this, tariff considerations are full of inconsistencies. Wine growers readily admit that, on some vintages, they do not have any product comparable to that bottled in France or Italy—but they want higher tariffs anyway. The cotton textile business is part of an industry which annually exports more than 3 million bales of American cotton. That is 41.5 percent of all the raw cotton produced and it is trade worth $1 billion and more. To raise tariffs on textiles now might threaten that business while creating new foreign competition for our exports of finished textiles, which is the opposite of the desired result.

There are, of course, other contradictions and other dilemmas—the most obvious being that with our own tariff walls high, the rest of the world cannot get the dollars with which to buy from us and important parts of the American economic system naturally produce surpluses whose only outlet is in foreign markets.

Even at their present level, United States trade barriers have induced violent reactions from other countries. Not long ago the United States placed restrictions on imports of dairy products—and we did it when we were exporting more cheese than we imported. Twelve countries—all good friends—protested. Venezuela, one of America's best customers, is exercised about legislative attempts to bar her oil from the United States and she says that this would promptly force Venezuelans to stop buying from the United States. Just who would be hurt most in this case is an open question. The oil in Venezuela is American-owned which means a loss to some United States investors for the benefit of others, and Venezuela buys more from the United States than she sells to us—including oil.

Tariffs get most of the headlines, but tariffs are not the most important deterrent to trade. On the books now is the "Buy American Act"—that relic of depression under which foreign goods are arbitrarily barred. Quota systems have also been written into defense acts—under which government bureaus and departments rule on whether or not imports can get in. There are also customs procedures, consular formalities and a grab bag of other rules, decrees, devices and laws by which foreign products can be and are excluded.

BUT IT IS not all one sided. The United States is not the sole and only user of trade restrictions. European countries are old experts at keeping out the other fellow's goods while getting favored markets for their own. Devaluation—as practiced by Great Britain—might well be permanently abandoned now in favor of efficient competition—always providing we, in the United States, don't make Chief Joseph Dam a national habit, thus negating competition entirely. Governments which control trade as they do armies—and which use trade for punitive purposes—could agree not to use state-owned trading subsidiaries as dumping agencies, again with the provision that we give over on dumping farm products. Im-

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Yummy!

port and exchange quotas, monetary manipulations, two price systems—all these and a good many other forms of restrictions characterize our world neighbors, hard-pressed for dollars, as much and more than they do us.

These restrictions, along with our own, can be negotiated out by treaty. The Benelux Agreement was a beginning along these lines as is the European Steel Community—but both of these and the newer Dutch proposal for a European Customs Union are exclusively European. The International Wheat Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) affect the whole world. GATT—proposed by businessmen—offers a real taste of what can be done when nations work together: first to make trade possible and then to make trade easier.

However, the initiative for agreements must come from the United States because we are the world's strongest trading power. Because of this desirable, but perhaps unasked for leadership, the United States can no longer live inside the old pattern of restricted, insulated trading —and this also applies to the business of trading between East and West.

United States aid to foreign nations is being decreased. Under this impact the historic pattern of trade between Western Europe and Eastern Europe—buried so long under the Cold War and a flood of United States dollars —is asserting itself once more. France has entered into a multi-million trade deal with Communist China and representatives of 50 British firms converged on Peking. Greece, in signing a trade agreement with Hungary, gave a concrete demonstration of what other poverty-stricken allies—such as Italy—will do if they cannot trade with us. And, of course, there is the mission to Moscow of Britain's most respected businessmen—and there is the $1¼ billion they were offered. Prime Minister Churchill's plea on February 25 for expanded trade between the Communist countries and the West as a force for peace capped the drive of our allies.

Our former enemies feel the push too. A rapid increase of domestic production, a 50 percent drop in trade with the United States and the prospect of diminishing United States subsidies characterize Western Germany which is—as a result—making strenuous efforts to deal with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The same tendency has boiled up in Japan. Peace in Korea meant a sharp cutback in United States spending which amounted to between $700 million and $800 million in the last year of the shooting. Faced with future slim pickings, Japan wants the United States Government to agree to ease restrictions on large-scale trade with her former partner, Mainland China.

It is silly to think—as our policy makers do—in terms of liberalizing American trade simply in order to stop this East-West trade from developing. American trade needs liberalization because America is the world's great trading nation and on it, internally and internationally, hangs the prosperity of the largest part of the world. And any international liberalization will, by its own logic, include not only a US relaxing of restrictions but more trade between East and West, including the United States.

MEANWHILE as the new "Moscow Gold Rush" gets under way, it is time that all segments of America wake up to the need for buying as well as for selling—from the whole world and to it. That takes a program the elements of which are: (1) The renewal, without amendment, of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act. (2) The repeal of the "Buy American" Act. (3) The reduction or elimination of tariffs on everything not connected with national defense. (4) Help in one form or another for every American business which is hurt in the process of obtaining the free trade necessary for world-wide prosperity. (5) A farm program which, though helping the hungry of our own and other lands, is beneficial to world agriculture.

If we carry out that program, the United States can become the free market which England was in the 19th Century. Producers throughout the world will use the United States as their own national market—and the price of this will be that the manufacturers and the farmers of the United States can use the world as their own market. No more constructive outlet for our enormous productive powers can be visualized. And—one other benefit—as a nation we will be able to say good-bye to our national schizophrenia.

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The Power of Admiral Strauss

The New Republic *continues its examination of Republican plans to change the Atomic Energy Law*

by Roland Sawyer

ANYONE who has ever encountered Lewis H. Strauss, chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, knows he has met a formidable man. Mr. Strauss is a man who in many ways is sure of himself and where he is going. In his previous Washington career as a member of the Commission, when David Lilienthal was chairman, Mr. Strauss achieved a notable record. Almost single-handed, Mr. Strauss convinced the commission that it should build the Hydrogen bomb because the Russians were sure to do so if they had not already begun. Also, Mr. Strauss was decisively influential in the Commission's decision to surround the Soviet world with a system for detecting its atomic explosions. Now Mr. Strauss is back again as chairman. He is in a position to be Mr. Atomic Energy of the United States and that is what he is. But Mr. Strauss is getting what is called in Washington a bad press, and it is reliably believed that he is distressed. For a man who works as hard as Lewis Strauss, this is understandable. But formidable men sometimes find themselves in such situations.



Strauss

If Mr. Strauss is distressed, some of his commissioners are exasperated. Charges are emanating from Democratic members of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee that Mr. Strauss, a Rear Admiral in the Naval Reserve (inactive), is running the AEC as if he were a flag officer on the bridge of a battleship. It is said that of the four other commissioners, at least two of them are not informed by Mr. Strauss as to what is going on. They had no idea, it is said, that President Eisenhower's world atomic pool program was going to be disclosed until they heard of the President's announcement to the United Nations. It is said they did not know Mr. Strauss was going to reopen security charges against Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer until they read about it in the papers. It has not been possible as yet to prove that these charges are true. This writer can say that if Mr. Strauss would meet the press he would deny them unequivocally and convincingly. But it is, I think, indisputable, that misunderstanding exists between Mr. Strauss and some of his commissioners over these particular points and several others.

The misunderstanding arises because a concept has been accepted in many people's minds that Mr. Strauss is a man ambitious for power and authority. This concept has emerged out of several situations. In the first place, Mr. Strauss has met the press only once since he took office last July, and that time briefly at a Presidential press conference. If Mr. Strauss is an ambitious man, as well as formidable, he is also sensitive and a little shy. Press conferences are probably not easy for him to conduct. Whatever the reason, it is true that a reputation has spread through the network of Washington correspondents that Mr. Strauss is even more opposed to a liberal public information policy, which the AEC never has had, than his predecessors. And, the present bill to amend the atomic energy law has a clause in it that will strengthen this conviction as its potentialities become known.

In the second place there is a letter written to Dr. Oppenheimer, formerly chairman of the AEC's General Advisory Committee, by Maj. Gen. K. D. Nichols, General Manager of the AEC, reopening the security case against him, in accordance with President Eisenhower's directive of April, 1953. This letter was widely resented among atomic scientists because it contained not the slightest hint that Dr. Oppenheimer had given the nation incredibly valuable services during World War II as director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, where the first atomic bombs were produced in time to be used.

Finally, there is a clause in the bill to revise the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which is currently before the Joint Congressional Committee which would, Mr. Strauss's critics charge, give him the legal authority which he already has assumed, that of the real executive of the Atomic Energy Commission, leaving the other commissioners in a purely advisory role, or less. This clause reads as follows: "The chairman shall be the principal officer of the Commission. . . ." Those within the Atomic Energy Commission and others in the Joint Congressional Committee who either are politically opposed to Mr. Strauss or ideologically distrustful of his methods, see dark implications in this clause.

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Of three questions, the last is probably the least important, for Lewis Strauss is, already, the principal officer of the Commission without any stipulation in the law being necessary. He could assume this mantle of authority simply by wrapping around himself all matters of critical information, without which the other commissioners would remain suspended in a vacuum. Without information they cannot operate efficiently. Some of them believe, rightly or wrongly, they have not received much information to which they are entitled. One of the particular bones of contention is that under the past Administration, not only the chairman of the AEC but all the commissioners were invited to the White House a few times to report on matters to the President. Since President Eisenhower has been there, however, he has received the Commission only once, in New York City.

What is far more important, and more difficult to explore, is the relationship of Lewis Strauss to the Oppenheimer case. Many atomic scientists unquestionably believe that in resurrecting the old charges against their hero, "Oppie," Mr. Strauss has an axe to grind not only against Dr. Oppenheimer but against the politically liberal scientific fraternity generally. Here again, much is rumor. There are rumors that Mr. Strauss is going to do this, or that. In a sense Mr. Strauss moves in a world of rumors. These undoubtedly arise from fear. But the scientific fraternity is not at one with the Oppenheimer case. One Berkeley, Calif., faction has always been opposed to Dr. Oppenheimer, a fact generally known among the scientists but which has not been much aired in the press. Where do they fit into the case? Dr. Oppenheimer opposed development of the hydrogen bomb in the way in which it was presented in 1949. In taking this stand he crossed the viewpoint of Mr. Strauss, then a commissioner, and Edward Teller, the atomic scientist of the Berkeley group who did for the H-bomb what "Oppie" did for the A-bomb.

Oppenheimer

Scientists fear that the Oppenheimer case really means that any one who disagrees with Mr. Strauss on a matter of policy must go, and that Mr. Strauss, former Admiral, Wall Street banker, and rich man, will go to any lengths necessary to expunge his opponents, even to using the security issue as a whip. This is an extremely serious charge, even to raise as a report of what some scientists are thinking. But it is a fact that many of them believe this. At least one has come to this writer's room after ten o'clock at night and told him so. These are the fears, justified or not. Unquestionably the Oppenheimer case is interwoven closely in the whole question of Mr. Strauss's uneasy relations with the press, the scientists and Democratic members of Congress. But how?

Perhaps the answer will be disclosed by Mr. Strauss himself in time, when the Oppenheimer case is decided by the Gray Board, presently considering the charges against him. Nuclear scientists will watch Mr. Strauss extremely closely in this period. It may turn out that Mr. Strauss moved against Dr. Oppenheimer to forestall an investigation of the AEC by Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy which, if true, would be welcomed almost universally by the scientific fraternity. Mr. Strauss could turn out in that situation to be something of a hero. There is nothing whatever in Mr. Strauss's record to suggest, up to now, that he is in any way sympathetic to the methods or objectives of "Senator Oh-Be-Quiet."

Even if this should turn out to be the fact, one unexplained factor remains. Since the Eisenhower Administration took office there has been much loose talk about providing the public with more general information about atomic energy in both the military and power fields. Mr. Strauss himself takes some pride in the report some weeks ago by the American Society of Newspaper Editors stating that the public information program of the AEC had improved in the past year. Why, therefore, has he allowed the Joint Congressional Committee to consider a law with a clause in it which will provide Mr. Strauss, as principal officer of the Commission, with a whip of censorship that is greater than now exists?

Section 223 of the new bill, headed "Criminal Provisions—Restricted Data," includes two new provisions as follows:

Any employee of the Commission or its varied contractural agencies who communicates restricted data to any person not authorized to receive such data shall be "punishable by a fine of not more than $2,500." And —and this is the key section—any person who *receives* restricted data from any such employee, "and having reason to believe that such information is restricted data and communicates it in any way to any person not authorized to receive such data" (italic) shall likewise be punishable by a $2,500 fine.

A FINE for $2,500 is not great. That is not the problem. The point is that an editor who publishes an article about atomic energy which may have been written purely from a process of deduction from available facts stands the risk of being blackballed if the AEC, which under the present ground rules would mean Mr. Strauss, should take him into court. This is a day when reputations are lost, virtually by the pointing of the finger, as Dr. Oppenheimer and many others know. How can it be proved whether or not a writer "has reason to believe" certain data was restricted or not? And what is restricted data? Extremely trivial government papers have been known to be classified as "restricted."

Mr. Strauss permitted this clause to go into the act. He still has the power to show the country that he is not the autocrat he has been charged with being, and that he will foster a policy that will give the American people more, not less information, about atomic energy.

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Rome Dispatch SCELBA ASKS A QUESTION

While Asian threats to the free world have centered attention on dramatic developments in Indo-China, notable progress has been made quietly but effectively toward strengthening some of the loose links of the Atlantic alliance in Europe: the Italian situation, for example.

It is quite true of course that the Italian Communist movement remains the largest and the strongest in the Western world. Nevertheless, if the country was in danger of embracing or yielding to the forces commanded by Palmiro Togliatti only a few months ago, as Mrs. Luce, the US Ambassador, rushed in something like panic to report to Washington—Premier Mario Scelba has worked wonders. The chance of a political Dien Bien Phu in any foreseeable future no longer exists.

There is a far better chance in Italy than in France of getting Parliament to ratify the EDC some time this summer or early autumn. Most important of all, the Italians are being prepared—and with apparent success—to accept the "deal" with Marshal Tito about Trieste that has been worked out behind the scenes in secret negotiations during the period of the Geneva conference.

But this situation, while welcome to Washington—as Secretary Dulles declared with a sigh of relief at his post-Geneva meeting with Scelba at Milan—is neither a tribute to nor a result of the leadership or guidance of the Eisenhower Administration. On the contrary, the reason is that Scelba has insisted on using his own methods of fighting the Communists and the various antis—American, European, Atlantic—rather than those favored by the White House and the State Department on the personal and strong advice of Mrs. Luce.



When the official Communist newspaper *Unita* personally insulted Scelba for sending a message of sympathy to the French Government on the occasion of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the Premier banned all Communist newspapers from access to government offices. It was a species of retaliation that came close to the edge of violating the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. And, at least by implication, it seemed a first step toward banning the Communist Party itself.

But at almost the same time, the Premier in his capacity as Minister of the Interior and therefore as head of the police, cracked down hard on the neo-Fascists. A number of terrorists, members of the so-called "black brigades" and of the recently revived FAR—Fascists of Revolutionary Action — were tracked down, thrown into jail; and arms and munitions were confiscated.

Such actitivities of Scelba's as his efforts to dig into Communist-controlled commercial companies and banks that run a large part of Western European's clandestine trade with Red China and the European satellites, and provide large sums of money for CP activities, are whole-heartedly approved by Mrs. Luce. On the other hand, however, Scelba believes that containment of Communism isn't enough; its sources of appeal, of political and psychological power must be weakened. And here, the Eisenhower Administration has much the same attitude as it has toward New Dealism in the US and everywhere: it is against.

What kind of Italy does Washington now want? Scelba put the question bluntly to Dulles at their meeting. Of course, Washington wants an anti-Communist and, if possible, a pro-American Italy. But does it also want a republican, democratic, anti-Fascist Italy?

Scelba wants both. His are the methods of Atlanticism and Europeanism in foreign policy, of toughness — almost to the point of illegality—against all domestic subversion, and—on the affirmative side at home—of a democratic socialist New Deal. Under his government, more is being done to bring the elements of progress to the Southern regions—now a major source of Communist voting strength—than during the long De Gasperi period.

Togliatti, ordered by Moscow to defeat the EDC at any cost, is nevertheless paying the present coalition government the high compliment of fighting its domestic reforms even harder than its foreign policy. The Communist leader has expressed a clear preference for the ideas and plans of Scelba's leading opponent of the Christian Democratic Right, former Premier Giuseppe Pella. For above all, he fears effective social reform.

And oddly, Mrs. Luce also leans toward Pella's intensely anti-New Deal plan for a "national front" extending from the Right Demochristians through the Monarchists to the neo-Fascists. The Roman Catholic Church, the most powerful political force in this country, is split on the issue. Some members of the College of Cardinals—Lercaro, Siri, Mimmi, Dalla Costa—believe in an anti-Communism coupled with social reform. But at the Vatican itself, and through its chosen political instrument, Luigi Gedda, the head of Catholic Action, most of its support goes to the Old Guard anti-modernists.

The question put by Scelba to Dulles was concerned with practical matters. Will the Eisenhower Administration insist on going through with Mrs. Luce's proposal to withhold US offshore orders from factories or industries which have many Communist workers? The Italian Premier said that such a stipulation would be disastrous in terms of continuation of the present hopeful trends in Italy. Will Mrs. Luce continue to support Pella, Andreotti, Togni, De Martino, Gedda and the Demochristian Right in their effort to make an alliance with the Monarchists and neo-Fascists? Nothing, according to Scelba, would help the Communists more in their propaganda that they—and they alone—stand for a republican, democratic, anti-Fascist Italy.

The American Secretary of State was said to be understanding, even sympathetic. At any rate, he commented that such meetings as the one he had had with the Italian Premier were worth more than international conferences (meaning, apparently, Geneva) and also than the best reports of even the most intelligent US Ambassadors (meaning, Italian democrats hope, Mrs. Luce). It remains to be seen whether the Ambassador or the Secretary has greater authority on Capitol Hill and the White House.

Rome FRANK GORRELL

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Dignity of Lyricism

by Peter Viereck

I

TRUE LYRIC POETS today, just as in every other day, sometimes write well and sometimes write badly. But all have this in common; they are not Alexandrians, not skillful and well-adjusted courtiers of coteries. Each may sometimes be what is patronizingly called "a poet's poet," but at least he is not that new American robot type which can be called a critic's poet; the former "looks in his heart and writes" while the latter looks for guidance in his bedside copy of *The Glossary of the New Criticism.* The latter writes only for critics—and not even for all critics but for a specialized group concerned largely with criticizing technique. The critic's poet and his favorite periodicals and oracles concentrate on technique to the neglect of content and to the neglect of that quality of song which modern poetry needs more than anything else, the quality I would characterize as *full-throatedness.*

In this conditioned-reflex between critics and critic's poet, each drives the other into what Auden calls "the rehearsed response." The result—paralleling the mechanization of modern life in general—sounds like two slot-machines, alternatively activating each other with the same counterfeit slug. No wonder the refreshing creative early New Critics and formalists privately admit that they feel increasingly uncomfortable about the hundreds of poetry-destroying automatons in some of the magazines and English departments, who repeat robot-like and on a conveyor-belt (a Kimon Friar, to take a typical minor example, or a John Berryman) what the originators of these techniques (for example, a John Crowe Ransom) did poetically and spontaneously.

The danger of these conveyor-belt dons, and the danger of their otherwise often valuable quarterlies like *Hudson Review,* has been currently noted in the London magazine *Twentieth Century* by Donald Davie:

> The professional poet has already disappeared from the literary scene, and the professional man of letters is following him into the grave. . . . It becomes more and more difficult, and will soon be impossible, for a man to make his living as a literary dilettante. . . . And instead of the professional man of letters we have the professional critic, the young don writing in the first place for other dons, and *only incidentally* for that supremely necessary fiction, the common reader. . . . The pedant is as common as he ever was. And now that willy-nilly so much writing about literature is in academic hands, his activities are more *dangerous* than ever. . . . The pedant is a very adaptable creature, and can be as comfortable with Mr. Eliot's "objective correlative," Mr. Empson's "ambiguities" and Dr. Leavis' "complexities" as in the older suit of critical clothes that he has now, for the most part, abandoned. [Italics mine.]

My various published essays, beginning in 1947, and consistently cautioning fellow poets and fellow readers against "adjusting" to this particular cult of criticism, have occasionally been misconstrued as attacks on criticism itself. Let us have no such anti-intellectualism; anti-intellectualism and mob irrationalism are already too rampant in a culture that unfortunately still honors hucksters higher than scholars. As someone to whom anti-intellectualism is as contemptible as lynch-law, my enduring purpose—through seven years of trying to chop a straight path, often tactlessly and with needless belligerence, through the jungles of jargon and coterie—has been to honor the high calling of criticism, whether New or Old, but deliberately to desecrate the cults, the pretentious idolatrous shrines of criticism-for-its-own-sake. Is it not strange and (for the cause of poetry) frightening that it should even have been necessary to remind one's hypnotized fellow-teachers of the following traditional truth: criticism, especially criticism of technique, is not independent of poetry nor superior to it nor antecedent to it but entirely dependent on the prior creative act—and as such (but only as such) valuable and indispensable.

Criticism and poetry are both necessary; but for the proper relationship between them, let us turn not to one of our humorless, pontifical mandarins but to a second British critic of our Alexandrian cults, G. Wilson Knight:

> A poet may, with the use of a little tact, get off comparatively lightly with his contemporaries. They accept his work as "poetry," and as such it can remain an unacknowledged, and with luck an ineffectual, legislator. But when anyone brings the fires of art, of genius, too close to life itself, there is a far greater hostility, the hostility met by Carlyle, by Ruskin, by Newman, by Nietzsche. . . . Such writers, of course, do not play the academic game; they *speak out too boldly,* and this is, if not exactly dangerous, certainly bad form. But it may be worth remembering that, *if they had always played the academic game, there would be no academic game* for any of us. Scholarship and criticism alike are parasitic on genius; and when someone, whilst making no great claims for himself, devotes his life to the cause of such genius, he is fighting, if only we could see it, in the same cause of scholarship and criticism *too.* . . . If only those writers who are approved by contemporary criticism were to be read and taught, criticism itself would quickly wither.

The famous New Critical method of analysis tends to treat a poem by itself, like a self-created airtight-sealed object, outside cause and effect. By discarding a poem's *irrelevant* historical, psychological, and "moralizing" encrustations, the New Critics have splendidly taught us to read the text itself. But by also discarding the *relevant* historical, psychological, and ethical aspects, they are often misreading the text itself. A reader's response to a poem is a total response, a *Gestalt* in which aesthetic as well as ethical, psychological, and historical factors are inseparably fused together. It is a self-deception to try to separate them and to discover some alchemistical quintessence of isolated "pure" aesthetics, to be judged only by

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certified "pure" mandarins of criticism. It may be argued that this inextricability of form and content is undesirable; in any case, that it exists is undeniable.

No modern poet worth his salt has failed to learn from Eliot. But no creative and individualist poet—in the sense of the Unadjusted Man—has failed to revolt (in varying degrees) against the dictatorial Eliot cult. The cult differs from Eliot as Stalinism differed from Marx. It is, therefore, unfair to blame Eliot for all those humorless, sanctimonious, and intolerant exaggerations of his cultists and for their prim, exclusive narrowness. Rather, his really serious vulnerability as an artist is on quite another score: despite all his extraordinary merits, which are rightly appreciated in our leading English departments, sometimes to the point of being drilled into young writers like a catechism — despite all his extraordinary merits, T. S. Eliot often lacks the final grace of poetry: sensuous texture.

This final grace is even more conspicuously absent in most of his American New Critic disciples, despite their many other excellences; it is lacking likewise in those few past and present poets to whom they (significantly) restrict their studies. After two generations of this narrowing process of elimination, it is not surprising that sensuous texture and full-throatedness have been completely bred out of the robot grandsons in today's graduate schools: those efficient, "adjusted" creatures — each proudly emitting a metallic clang as he writes—whom I have defined as "critic's poets."

The sensuous texture lacking in Eliot you will find not only in poets greater than Eliot, like Keats and Yeats, but also in poets lesser than Eliot, like Gray and Beddoes. So it is not necessarily a concomitant of greatness, nor of philosophical insight, though always a concomitant of magic. Sensuous texture is what makes ideas dance, what makes cogitative verse at the same time also musical, and what makes music full-throated in the old, half-forgotten, unashamed fashion.

But what some of us ultimately miss in the poet of *The Waste Land* is wastefulness, that sense of generous overflowing of so much talent that the talent can dare to squander itself even on nonsense and the fun of luxuriant affectations, on all kinds of egomanias and capricious obsessions; can dare, can afford all this because secure in the knowledge that it has enough spare talent left over—after these self-indulgences—to produce immortal creations *anyway*. Important is the "anyway" quality—what I would call the "Quad-memsness"—of all inspired artists. Such a profligacy, rather than a stingy hoarding of talent and rather than getting the most out of every clutched grain of it, seems to characterize the great, full-toned voices of world literature.

Without wastefulness, no generosity. Without generosity, no love, no Christian charity, ultimately no Christianity. When a poet lacks the vice of wasting and squandering himself lavishly, then he also lacks the aesthetic virtue of the full range, the universal human note, the rich careless vibrancy of authentic genius. This universal and full-toned authenticity is what is being exiled and destroyed in some of our universities by the Eliot-Pound-New Critic cult, a cult *desirable* and justified when still young and still within limits but stifling when it becomes the only kind of poetry taught, intolerant and joyless and narrow, a roadblock to growth and change.

When taken in the context of my stress on form and on compression into form, the above five paragraphs will not be misunderstood as arguments for a nineteenth-century bohemianism of would-be "geniuses" or as arguments for a romantic revolt of song and emotion *against* restraint and rigor; on the contrary, only *within* the strictest restraint, the most classic rigor, can song and emotion be compressed into poetic intensity (instead of sprawling forth sloppy, formless, and diffuse). The more restraint the better, Eliotic and New Critical; but meanwhile let our critic's poets not completely forget Roy Campbell's "bloody horse":

> You praise the firm restraint with
> which they write—
> I'm with you there, of course.
> They use the snaffle and the curb
> all right;
> But where's the bloody horse?

Eliot and a few of the older New Critics represent so much positive achievement that "normally" it might seem captious, might even seem maliciously belittling to blame them for not achieving various other things which perhaps they never even tried to achieve in the first place. The last decade, however, is no "normal" situation in American letters. What confronts us is whole robot-armies of regimented "poets," critics, and professors. Each robot intones dutifully, "I'm a real human being, an independent, nonconforming, *avant-garde* aesthete, just like everybody else." These machine-armies have made compulsory official uniforms for poetry of even the most threadbare and discarded garments of Eliot and his generation. In such a situation, is it not high time for some last embattled remnant of unregimented killjoys — unadjusted spoilsports and outsiders-by-choice—to blurt out an unwelcome, ill-mannered message: "The clothes have no emperor!"

Nobody can predict how the new young poets of today can ever achieve the vitality of the early Pound-Eliot movement that followed 1912. But one can easily predict how they will never achieve it: namely, by continuing to imitate Eliot and Pound, both of whom had the great virtue of not imitating but defying the sacred cows of *their* day.

This is the first section of a two-part essay by Mr. Viereck—THE EDITORS.

Motives of Liberalism

WHITTAKER CHAMBERS is an authentic example of the young liberal intellectual who became a Communist a generation ago. So is Granville Hicks, and his case is far more typical. He never became a spy—he never even knew one—and therefore has no cloak-and-pumpkin sequences to reveal. Moreover he is not constrained to immolate himself in public and he ended up as a liberal—a "critical liberal." But for these very reasons the youngest generation, to whom his book is dedicated, would do well to read it. They may concede that their predecessors who plumped for Marx's ideas and the Soviet experiment were not *ipso facto* fools or felons. And I hope that they will not miss certain other facts. Though the Soviet-struck liberals of the thirties were wrong, they were not as wrong as the Republicans who fought the New

Where We Came Out, by Granville Hicks (Viking; $3.50).

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Deal. The two groups, however, have acted differently in the event. The liberals admitted their mistakes. The Republicans went on denouncing the New Deal; but meanwhile the Republican Party has taken over many of its principles and, however, unwillingly, is continuing many of its practices. Few Republicans these days come out against social security, collective bargaining, and guaranteed bank deposits; but neither do they make a point of admitting nor are they called upon to admit that they were wrong twenty years ago.

Mr. Hicks' account is conscientious, well-ordered, and convincing. Yet a *caveat emptor* seems to me in order. From reading it one might conclude that naïveté and idealism were the only motivations of the liberal intellectuals who joined or traveled with the party. These motivations were important, even primary, but it would be naïve and idealistic to assume that they were the only ones. If they had been, the obsession with Soviet Russia, for and against, would not have gone on as long as it did; factional fights would not have so much resembled fights for power and precedence among the less enlightened.

It may seem superfluous to say that liberals are moved by the same drives as ordinary mortals. I have learned, however, through bitter experience that liberals are more prone than ordinary mortals to deceive themselves about their drives—as if they had swallowed very early a syllogism that goes down all too easily, to wit: a liberal by definition is disinterested and rational; I am a liberal; therefore I am disinterested and rational. But emotions and motives exercise even more power when they are hidden and denied than when they are admitted and aired; and I have observed many a liberal, *i.e.*, a presumably disinterested and rational, opinion so loaded with unadmitted motives that it slanted like the tower of Pisa.

Mr. Hicks does indicate some of the baser drives I have in mind when he speaks of the part played by personality problems and the desire for a secular religion or refers to the attraction of a panacea that the Soviet myth exercised. He does not say outright what I think needs to be said—that many a liberal intellectual was fascinated not only by the economic and social goods that Soviet Communism promised but by the evils it incorporated: absolute power, violence, fanaticism, and the catastrophic view of history which turns human beings into "the masses" and renders inconsequential their mere individual lives. In theory, liberals are immune to such temptations. In reality they are, of course, as susceptible as other human beings. And as I noted years ago, one proof that fellow-traveling provides a vicarious outlet for these baser drives was the scarcely audible approval with which the peaceful victory of socialism in Britain was celebrated by those liberals who were still enchanted by Soviet Communism.

My word for the young is that eternal vigilance toward one's own motives as well as the other fellow's is the price of being a genuine liberal. Meanwhile my strictures do not affect the validity of three important facts. They are all documented in Mr. Hicks' book and they may even be recognized in due time by the public at large. (1) It was natural, almost inevitable, that American intellectuals, confronted with the depression at home and Nazism abroad, should have plumped for a set of ideas and an experiment that seemed to offer a solution. (2) The great majority of these liberal intellectuals, having sorted out the fallacies from the insights in Marx's ideas and having seen the Soviet monstrosity for what it was, rejected Communism with as much fervor as they had accepted it. (3) Perhaps most important, the immunization which they achieved from having caught and recovered from the Communist infection and which they passed on to their younger contemporaries is now an important source of strength in the cold war—just as the low-to-high infection which still afflicts so many European intellectuals is a source of weakness.

In due time. But the time is not yet. Still, it is just possible that McCarthy, in attacking Eisenhower's army—like the witch-hunters of Salem when they accused the governor's wife—is about to be hoist with his own absurdity. It is faintly possible that if the security board now investigating Oppenheimer is convinced of his loyalty it may not only say so but also recommend that he be allowed to continue in government service—thereby asserting the right to explore ideas, including those that may turn out to be wrong, a right which is even more essential to our defense than a Z-bomb capable of destroying the world in one operation. And there is at least a chance that the country will accept the proposition, which is one of the principal points of Mr. Hicks' book, that the external threat of Soviet aggression is far greater than the internal and that failure to recognize this fact, along with the attempts to suppress dissenting opinion by means of laws and Congressional inquiries, weakens our defenses against the external threat. For among the peoples of the world our freedoms give us far more prestige of the sort we need than even our prosperity or our bombs.

Mr. Hicks pays his disrespects to the Fake, Retarded, and Ritualistic Liberals who if McCarthy didn't exist would be forced to invent him and to the Panicky Conservatives who see Communism in the mildest liberal measure. He has few good words, either, for the Renegades and Informers — ex-Communists who have made a profession of anti-Communism. He offers sensible advice for fighting Communism. Finally he sums up The Way We Live Now. He finds it on the whole infinitely better in economic and social terms than it was before the New Deal—but not good enough in other ways. The "critical liberal" is bound to agree. MARGARET MARSHALL

A New Machiavelli

IN 1947 Hans Morgenthau produced a book, *Politics Among Nations*, which may fairly be described as bringing Machiavelli up to date. Six years of further observation on the international scene have led Professor Morgenthau to bring himself up to date. This second edition is completely revised, with especial view to colonial revolutionism and the various efforts of governments to make supra-governmental agreements both within and without the UN.

Professor Morgenthau is like Machiavelli not only in the felicity of his examples but in his hopes that eventually man, by understanding his own power drives and working with them, can create a better state. Machiavelli wanted his Prince to unite Italy, while our present author cautiously looks forward to steps which will "create the conditions not now existing under which it will not be impossible from the outset

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to establish a world order." Perhaps some of his caution comes from the fact that the very nationalism which seemed such a sure good to Machiavelli has turned out to be the greatest obstacle to peace today.

In the beginning Professor Morgenthau admits that when he talks of "political man" he by definition excludes

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, by Hans J. Morgenthau (Knopf; $7.50.).

various other "men," such as economic man and ethical man. With economic man he has no particular quarrel; he simply states that wars are not fought for economic purposes and lets the conclusion be drawn that the economic interpretation of history has been vastly overrated.

It is only when ethical man, or at least moralistic man gets in the way of political man that politics are cramped; in other words when political man no longer dares to be frankly concerned with his country's "interests defined in terms of power." Religious wars are the most bitterly inhuman of all wars, and the great danger of today is that Communism and democracy will acquire the force of new religions so that their spokesmen can no longer horsetrade on the basis of enlightened self-interest.

Even though he feels that the falling of the world into two blocs is not quite so close and inevitable as it seemed six years ago, Professor Morgenthau points out the dangerous inability of Soviet and American diplomats to perform diplomatically, to secretly arrive at the open covenants the modern world demands. As for the United Nations, it is turning into a "grand alliance" against the Soviet bloc. Parliamentarianism on the international scale has none of the supporting features which make it work within countries, and therefore our constant efforts to get a two-thirds majority on the floor of the General Assembly are worse than wasted. Such votes give neither a realistic appraisal of our strength nor an effective means of accomplishing our will. Therefore we should not prostitute parliamentarianism but should revive the only method in the world today that offers any reasonable hope of chipping away at the differences of the cold war.

Politics Among Nations ends with a desperate plea that we learn to respect the international horse trader instead of the crusader who makes so much finer a display on television.

Our author remarks that his views no longer make him as lonely as he felt just at the end of the war. Yet his voice is still in the minority against those who tell us that at last, as in Berlin and Korea, we have demonstrated the sort of moral determination that can sweep Communism back. Is this carefully fostered righteousness a danger? Professor Morgenthau never once discusses which side has "right" on its side, he cares only for the clear perception of the "facts" of power politics, on the theory that two interests can often be adjusted when two truths cannot.

Only by a lifetime of devotion to his discipline could Professor Morgenthau have made his convincing judgments on the actual distribution of political power today and in the hopes for various types of restraint on that power.

But, supposing we look at power from *outside* his discipline for a moment, let us consider what a student of "psychological man" might have to say.

One hesitates to tear down a political scientist's last best hope, yet is not the idea of enlightened self-interest very close to a dream? Wouldn't it be just as hard to come by as enlightened unselfishness, to which indeed it is close kin? The raw human being has unconscious forces that push him crudely toward self-gratification, but for these to become anything that could be called enlightened means that the unconscious must be made conscious. This process as everyone knows is usually hard—but it is probably no harder to become fully conscious of your wish to love than of your will to power. There is no doubt that rationality as well as unselfishness have existed spottily in the world. Still, the terror of our political situation, of the "forces inherent in human nature," which Professor Morgenthau thinks it realistic to work *with*, is that they are *ir*rational, *un*enlightened and *un*cooperative; and that they are as likely to burst forth in an ill-directed passion for the one true faith as in half-concealed aggression against a smaller neighbor. Professor Morgenthau has allowed for these forces to be selfish but he has not quite allowed for them to be unreasonable, at least in his hopes for the future.

Nor is it as certain as Professor Morgenthau thinks that human reaction to power is a constant. To assume that an American and a Russian feel the same way about power is to assume that their cultures deal with authority in the same way, and this we know not to be true. One of the few really unbuttressed statements in the whole book is that "most people are unable to satisfy their desire for power within the national community," with the inference that they like wars. Some psychological evidence indicates that an increase in freedom lessens the craving for power. There may even be a tendency to escape from power, as Erich Fromm has shown the "escape from freedom." David Riesman believes that an unwillingness to hold power exists in wide sections of American society today—and one wonders if similar feelings could have eased Britain's exit from India (though Morgenthau explains this in purely political terms). Then in certain totalitarian countries, according to Hannah Arendt, love of power has become so pathological that even Professor's Morgenthau's diplomats couldn't do anything with it, since its crazy wish is to reduce everyone to a brain-washed victim.

The fact that these self-consistent theories of power are not congruent with each other brings at present no discredit on any one of them, but is only a sign of the stage our social sciences have reached. Students need time for interdisciplinary research, for surely eventually all aspects of power can be studied as parts of the same thing; and that time will come—if only our diplomats are sufficiently enlightened.

PRISCILLA ROBERTSON

Notes on the Critics

PETER VIERECK'S most recent book of lyrical poems is *The First Morning;* he is also the author of *The Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals* and other books attacking totalitarianism. A professor at Mount Holyoke College, Dr. Viereck has received the Pulitzer Prize. MARGARET MARSHALL, formerly the literary editor of *The Nation*, is at work on a new book. PRISCILLA ROBERTSON is the author of *Revolutions of 1948: a Social History.* ERIC BENTLEY'S edition of Pirandello's *Right You Are* was recently published by the Columbia University Press.

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THEATRE

AMERICAN WRITERS have more success with light comedy than with other forms of drama. In fact American light comedy has become one of the more vital elements of world theatre. Even in Europe the lively item in a current repertoire is not unlikely to be an American light comedy—perhaps one that the youngest generation here has never seen, such as *Three Men on a Horse* or *The Man Who Came to Dinner*. And anyone who read through the plays of the twenties and thirties would, I believe, be less inclined to exhume the problem plays of that problem period than, say, *The Torchbearers* or *Boy Meets Girl*.

Reviewing American light comedies, however, I find myself continually remarking the same flaw: an intrusion of crass sentimentality. If the greatest of American comedies are Chaplin's films, it is to be noted that we find the flaw there too. We find it again in the two best light comedies of the 1953-4 season, *Oh, Men! Oh, Women!* by Edward Chodorov and *King of Hearts* by Jean Kerr and Eleanor Brooke. Are American authors unwilling to stay inside the boundaries of merriment? Hag-ridden by some notion of "adding a third dimension of feeling," they only succeed in pushing their fists through their canvases.

That, at least, is my interpretation of the sudden eruption of the passions at various points in both plays, accompanied, as it is, with a sudden access of morality on the part of the authors. All of a sudden, the smile disappears, and we are invited to take a palpitating interest in the needs of children, the duties of parents, the responsibilities of spouses and psychoanalysts, not to mention the promptings of the heart and that Note of Hope which is the Broadway equivalent of a shot in the arm.

It is surprising, perhaps, to what an extent the two new plays are the same old one: variants on that classic theme of comedy, the misadventures of a professional impostor. Mr. Chodorov's psychoanalysts and the Brooke-Kerr comic-strip artist both think they are gods. The plot in both cases is one long attempt, on the authors' part, to humanize them by humiliation. In *Oh, Men! Oh, Women!* the attempt is successful; in *King of Hearts*, it is not: the protagonist is beyond cure.

In this respect, it is the Chodorov that is more characteristic of American light comedy, the Brooke-Kerr that will come in for criticism as being heterodox, and heartless, if not dangerous and un-American. Brooks Atkinson says so bad a man weighs a light comedy down. Wolcott Gibbs says he arouses such loathing that the actor in the part runs the risk of assassination. From the first critic, I derive this principle: a monstrous character has no place in light comedy. From the second, this: a monstrous character has no place on the stage. Both principles are an established part of Times Square philosophy.

Implicit in New York journalism is a whole philosophy of drama according to which it is good that characters in plays be good or at least likeable: People Are Nice. Sometimes this thought takes a political form and might be summed up as Democratic Good Will. At other times it seems to be a theory of audience psychology. "We must care about the characters." Well, that much is easy to agree to, but the New York theory of drama is that you only care when you also sympathize—or, in the jargon of the intellectual underworld, "empathize." With whom can you identify yourself. "Who are you rooting for?" Like football.

I suppose it is one of the philosophies or pseudo-philosophies that constitute the growing pains of democracy. It is wildly untraditional. The traditional way of telling the impostor story is exemplified in Carl Sternheim's *The Snob*. Sternheim wastes no more sympathy on his hero than Ben Jonson on Morose or Moliére on Tartuffe: he confronts us with a man who is completely dehumanized by snobbery, a non-man, a monster. Now *King of Hearts* is no classic, but what was generally written off as its weakness is classic enough and is its strength: the protagonist is a bad man who, having no goodness in him at all, cannot conceivably turn into an angel in the last act. Such a character is not felt, but seen; the authoresses see him and, with their abundant and non-mechanical wit, enable us to see him too. Why should we want them to be sentimentalists, blinded by their own tears?

Both *Oh, Men! Oh, Women!* and *King of Hearts* are well performed. It is almost *de rigueur* on Broadway that a light comedy be well performed, it is only "serious plays" that are left to the untender mercies of Passionate Sincerity. Light comedy has to be acted. And it sets the director as hard a task as he will ever be asked to perform. Anyone can direct a mere play; it takes a George Abbott to direct light comedy; Edward Chodorov (directing his own play) and Walter Kerr (tackling *King of Hearts*) place themselves in the Abbott tradition in their excellent "business," their adroit manipulation of "props," and, above all, their brisk pacing and hair's-breadth timing. Their casting was extraordinary. Granted that Franchot Tone has an embarrassing part in the Chodorov—both too passive and too serious—the authority of his presence and the purposefulness of his manner at least prevent the role becoming a minor one. The minor parts of course give a better impression. Anne Jackson does a finely etched impression of the discontented wife (vintage 1953). Gig Young and Larry Blyden also do ironic and shaded, yet zany and full-blooded performances.

Who would have thought of Jackie Cooper for the amiable but mousy suitor in *King of Hearts?* How solve the problem of a heroine who must be stupid and not stupid at the same time—except by appealing to Cloris Leachman's looks and talent? And as for Donald Cook. . . . It would have been very well for the critics to say their Christian charity, their democratic zeal, or their bad digestion prevents them accepting a stage monster, had they gone on to remark that Mr. Cook has his own way of making the public swallow him. His own way? The classic way: he keeps actor and character separate and induces the audience to love one while hating the other—as actors of the part of Richard III or any other enjoyable (but not sympathetic) villain have done for centuries.

In view of *Private Lives* and *The Moon Is Blue*, the personality and technique of Mr. Cook should already have been familiar. I confess that, until now, I didn't quite "get" either. *King of Hearts* is his show. His feline walk, his funny drawl with its inordinate vowels, his sure-fire smile, along with whatever is less definable, though no less real, make of an ambivalent presentation an uncompromising performance and an unequivocal success.

ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Challenges Mallan's View

It is my understanding that John P. Mallan, author of "Massachusetts—Saltonstall Faces a Fight" (*NR*, May 3), is currently working in behalf of the candidacy of Foster Furcolo for U. S. Senate. This may explain why Mr. Mallan very carefully avoided mentioning anything about Furcolo's position on Senator McCarthy.

Mr. Furcolo has been consistently unwilling to criticize Senator McCarthy or McCarthyism since he began his campaign. Mr. Mallan should know that any true and dispassionate political analysis of Furcolo . . . would include discussion on this major point.

BETTY TAYMOR
West Newton, Massachusetts

. . .

Foster Furcolo, a former Massachusetts Congressman, and former "darling" of the local ADA, has become the No. 1 convert to reaction in the Bay State in 1954.

What did Furcolo do that was wrong? He accepted the invitation of the Massachusetts ADA group to be the main speaker, at the annual 1954 get-together. He led the officials to believe that he was still loyal to the ideals of ADA. Instead, with calculated premeditation, he dined with his host, in public, and then to the amazement of the group, stood up and cold-bloodedly insulted his audience to their teeth by saying in effect: "Your usefulness is over. Close-up shop. Commit suicide."

It was like a St. Patrick's day speaker condemning St. Patrick. It was the boldest double-cross Bay State politics has known in years. Nobody objects to Furcolo changing his mind. 99 out of 100 politicians leave any organization that they feel will hurt them on election day. But, it was the unnecessarily brutal way that the switch was accomplished. And, worst of all, the incident gave another "black eye" to the ADA that fights for the better life, at a moment when reaction battles hardest to kill ADA.

After reading the Mallan article, I got the opinion that "well, Furcolo might have done a little wrong, but still he is better than the rest." Nonsense!

On this issue, Arthur Schlesinger's objection in your columns is 100 percent right.

CLEMENT A. NORTON, *former Chairman, Boston School Committee*
Boston, Massachusetts

► And Mallan Replies

It takes many years for the lumbering processes of history to produce a candidate for high office who is both able and has a chance at election; in this state, a poor primary system has meant the loss of a Senate seat in a basically Democratic area in some five elections since 1936. If the present opportunity is lost, another six years must pass, six years in which the nation may badly need another liberal vote in the Senate.

Since I first heard of Foster Furcolo's Congressional activities in 1948, I had hoped he might become such a candidate; my article made it plain that I personally support him this year. Mrs. Taymor, an ADA leader like Mr. Schlesinger, has allowed her natural concern for the group to lead her into enlarging a debate on the effectiveness of ADA in Massachusetts into a wholly unjustified attack on Furcolo's liberalism. She seems unaware, for instance, that Furcolo has already made a highly effective series of TV broadcasts on issues ranging from Indo-China to low-income housing, and that he intends to continue this, weekly until November. Here alone, he is offering the state's voters a more effective "New Deal" education than they have ever previously had, on a statement basis.

JOHN P. MALLAN
Cambridge, Massachusetts

► Flexible Prices and Farmers

In his article, "Don't Kick the Farmer," (*NR*, May 10) Mr. Mitchell states.

> Furthermore, even when farm prices plummet, the inflexibilities in marketing margins allow only a small drop at the retail level and often no drop at all. Processors and middlemen cannot take any sizable reduction in cents per unit, because their costs are inflexible too.

This statement contains an internal conflict. It should be obvious that the most important single component of such businesses' costs is the price which they must pay for their raw material, *i.e.*, agricultural products, and the fact that these farm prices are "plummeting" would indicate that these businesses' costs *are* flexible, not inflexible.

Second, so long as we assume monopolies to be inevitable, no lasting solution can be had to the agricultural problem. The benefits of any program to aid agriculture must inevitably accrue to the monopolies from which the farmer makes his purchases of capital and consumer goods and to the monopolies to whom the farmer sells his produce. . . . Competition is no panacea, but its presence would be of tremendous value in solving the agricultural problem.

R. A. ROBERTSON
Champaign, Illinois

. . .

In reply to Mr. Robertson, may I point out that the average consumer-dollar spent for farm products is split 45c to the farmer and 55c to the various middlemen and processors. This 55c marketing margin is almost completely inflexible. Beef prices, which recently dropped 30% at the farm, dropped only 15% at retail. The marketing margin in cents per pound of beef remained unchanged . . . apparently no significant monopoly forces were to blame. Inflexibility in present-day American economic activities cannot be explained by any such over-simplified word as "monopoly," nor can "competition" be considered an alternative to these inflexibilities. The lesson in all this is that the American economy behaves in different manners depending on its direction. If prices are steady or rising, production responds brilliantly *and flexibly*. If prices are uncertain or dropping, the economic system falters badly, but in varying ways—in agriculture production continues unchecked and farmers go broke—in industry production is sharply curtailed and workers go broke. My point is that "no lasting solution can be had to the agricultural problem" or indeed the more important problems of a prosperous expanding national economy until we recognize that traditional economic "theory," either of competition or of monopoly, can tell us little about *how* to keep America prosperous.

C. CLYDE MITCHELL
Lincoln, Nebraska

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► More on Agriculture

Neither Mr. Wallace nor Mr. Mitchell mentions compensatory payments to farmers as a method of farm relief. (This is a program whereby agricultural products would be moved into consumption on the basis of free market prices, with agricultural producers to be paid a direct subsidy to increase farm income.) Such payments could be limited as regards the amount going to a single farmer, they could be made conditional on the farmer following approved soil conservation practices, or directed in any manner deemed by the Congress to be most beneficial to agriculture and the public interest. Certainly the consumer would fare better under this method of farm relief than under the present price-support program; and for any given expenditure of federal funds, agriculture would probably gain as much. Assuming that we have a farm problem which must be met with public funds, I am surprised that both writers passed over this direct and common sense approach to it.

A. C. HOFFMAN

St. Charles, Illinois

. . . .

Henry Wallace's piece in your May 3 issue seems to rest mainly on the assumption that lower farm prices will reduce farm production. That is nonsense. A fruitful discussion of our farm problem heads right into our foreign trade policies and world power politics, to say nothing of monopoly control of industrial production and pricing of pretty much everything.

You know how hard it is to give our wheat away to hungry people in countries that we rate as "friends" because it upsets their economies, etc. Well, in a recent discussion I suggested that we try giving it to our "enemies" whose economies are somewhat different and perhaps not so easily upset. But I got nowhere.

THAD SNOW

Van Buren, Missouri

. . .

Articles on the farm problem usually assume that it pertains only to basic crops. What of the three-fourths of agriculture classified as non-basic? The story of honey is symptomatic.

The issue is an adequate bee population to pollinate the fifty crops dependent upon the honeybee for the production of fruit and seed, a service vital to the food supply of the United States. The fact that bee population has decreased by almost 400,000 colonies since 1947 indicates that beekeepers cannot provide this service unless a fair price is paid for honey.

LAURA SHEPHARD

Calexico, California

► Some Plot, Mr. Bentley

Eric Bentley's very rewarding theatre pieces in the *New Republic* would at times be quite unintelligible to me if Mr. Gibbs were not willing to complete his chores for the *New Yorker* by telling the story. Perhaps the editors could help with a line much as they do for book reviews—play, title, author and theatre when it is needed for a discussion of a particular play. I have assumed Mr. Bentley didn't write just for those in the know but for those anywhere who were willing through understanding to allow theatre arts to enrich their lives. His pieces have been among the best I've had in the past year.

JANE H. WOOD

Madison, Wisconsin

► US Life Expectancy

Relative to Bruce Bliven's excellent review of *Eleven Blue Men* (*NR*, May 10), Bliven states that the "American lifespan is more than twice as great as that of other parts of the world where public-health services are at their worst." This statement is not supported by statistical facts.

According to the United Nations Department of Public Information, published this year, the life expectancy in this country for *male infants* is 65.9. The comparable figures for Denmark, Germany (Federal Republic), and the Netherlands—to name just a few countries with few or no public health services—are 67.8 or 64.56 or 69.4 respectively; in other words, in two of these countries, the life expectancy is even higher than in our country!

HANS A. ILLING

Los Angeles, California

► A Connecticut Yankee

My 10-year-old child is enjoying Mark Twain's *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* and calls attention to a passage to which the banners of *Robin Hood* would find even greater objection:

"You see my kind of loyalty was loyalty to one's country, not to its institutions or its office-holders. The country is the real thing, the substantial thing, the eternal thing; it is the thing to watch over, and care for, and be loyal to; institutions are extraneous, they are its mere clothing, and clothing can wear out, become ragged, cease to be comfortable, cease to protect the body from winter, disease, and death. To be loyal to rags, to shout for rags, to worship rags, to die for rags—that is a loyalty of unreason, it is pure animal; it belongs to monarchy, was invented by monarchy; let monarchy keep it. I was from Connecticut, whose Constitution declares 'that all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their benefit; and that they have *at all times* an undeniable and indefeasible right to *alter their form* of government in such a manner as they may think expedient."

ROBERT F. ROTHSCHILD

New York City

► Trial by Television

We are enjoying the Michael Straight series on the McCarthy hearings very much—only wish it were longer. Perhaps there will be a need for lots more of it.

MAJOR J. L. JACKSON

Montgomery, Alabama

The NR's exclusive report on the McCarthy-Army controversy will be resumed by Editor Straight in the next issue.

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

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